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Fighting Irregular Fighters

Is the Law of Armed Conflict Outdated?
Sibylle Scheipers
© 2013 Sibylle Scheipers

Abstract: The law of armed conflict has often been described as
outdated and ill suited to military conflicts in the twenty-first century. Both academics and practitioners have argued that today’s wars
tend to be asymmetric conflicts between states and nonstate actors,
whereas the law of armed conflict was made with a view to symmetrical interstate war. This article challenges that notion.

T

he law of armed conflict—from the Lieber Code to the Additional
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions—was drafted precisely as a
response to challenges posed by irregular fighters. The problems
with applying the law to irregular warfare stem from two aspects: first,
that the drafters of the law repeatedly chose a negative approach to irregular fighters. They neither provided an explicit definition of an irregular
fighter nor did they spell out principles for their lawful treatment. The
second aspect is that the aims of western military interventions differ
considerably from earlier forms of anti-irregular fighting: in today’s antiirregular wars, political stabilization and societal reconciliation are the
main political objectives. Thus, the central question facing both academics and practitioners is how the law of armed conflict can be applied in a
way that furthers these political aims.
The terror attacks of 9/11 and the military operations in their aftermath sparked a debate over the status and applicability of the law of
armed conflict in the wars of the twenty-first century. Policymakers on
both sides of the Atlantic were quick to assert that the law itself, most
of which was drafted during the twentieth century, was inapplicable on
the battlefields of the twenty-first century. The argument that the law of
armed conflict was ill suited for the new paradigm of what would become
known as the War on Terror was decisive for the Bush administration’s
decision in February 2002 not to apply the Geneva Conventions to al
Qaeda and Taliban fighters captured in Afghanistan.1 Although most
Europeans like to think of themselves as having consistently opted for
a rule-of-law approach to terrorism, senior officials in Europe echoed
the argument.2

1     President’s Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence,
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
“Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees”’ (Washington, DC, 7 February 2002). The
memorandum states: “By its terms, Geneva applies to conflicts involving ‘High Contracting Parties,’
which can only be states. Moreover, it assumes the existence of ‘regular’ armed forces fighting on
behalf of states. However, the war against terrorism ushers in a new paradigm, one in which groups
with broad international reach commit horrific acts against innocent civilians, sometimes with the
direct support of states. Our nation recognizes that this new paradigm—ushered in not by us, but
by terrorists—requires new thinking in the law of war, but thinking that should be nevertheless
consistent with the principles of Geneva.”
2     John Reid, “Twenty-First Century Warfare —Twentieth Century Rules,” RUSI Journal 151, no.
3 (2006): 14-17.
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The assumption on which this assessment is based is that the law of
armed conflict was drafted with a view to symmetrical interstate wars,
whereas wars in the twenty-first century will be asymmetric conflicts in
which regular state forces are fighting against a variety of actors such
as terrorists, rebels, insurgents, militias, mercenaries, pirates, and so on,
who are usually lumped together under the notion of nonstate actors.
Symmetry implies reciprocity, meaning all parties to a conflict will abide
by the same rules. The concept of belligerent reprisals, which were a
legitimate means of war until the drafting of the Geneva Conventions
in 1949, reflects this assumption of reciprocity: if one party to a conflict
systematically breaks the law of armed conflict, the opponent is entitled
to retaliate in kind or in another punitive way to ensure the law is upheld.
In asymmetric conflicts—and it is important to note that the notion
of asymmetric warfare predates the War on Terror and encompasses not
only terrorism but also conflicts in the peripheries of the international
system variously labeled new wars, low-intensity conflict, military operations other than war, or fourth generation warfare—reciprocity is by
definition undermined.3 The concept of asymmetric warfare implies that
a weaker opponent with fewer military capabilities and resources is pitted
against a powerful state actor. Weak opponents will use almost any means
at their disposal to achieve their aims in war; they will use terrorist tactics,
attack civilians, plant roadside bombs, and kill prisoners if they happen to
capture any.4 However, weak opponents, although not abiding by the law,
will challenge any perceived transgression on the part of the state actor
and exploit it in the court of international public opinion. They will even
provoke such transgressions by using human shields around high-value
targets. This vulnerability of the stronger side to allegations of violations
of the law of armed conflict has been referred to as “lawfare.”5 Hence,
in this perspective, championing the law means all sorts of pain, but no
gain, for the stronger side in an asymmetric conflict.
The common conclusion to this type of analysis is that the law
of armed conflict is outdated, that it needs to be either suspended or
revised, and that we should not be surprised to see new moral and legal
norms on the use of armed force arising and becoming institutionalized.
The question rarely asked is whether the law was really drafted with a
view to symmetrical interstate war—that regulative ideal that scholars,
commentators and policymakers alike seem to grasp to understand the
unruly and confusing battlefields of the twenty-first century.

From Lieber to Additional Protocol I

One of General Henry W. Halleck’s first acts as General-in-Chief
of all the Union armies was to commission a legal memorandum from
3     For a general overview on asymmetric warfare, see Rod Thornton, Asymmetric Warfare: Threat
and Response in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge: Polity, 2007). On the alleged global transformation
of warfare more generally, Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars: Organized Violence in a Global Era (Stanford,
CA: Stanford University Press, 2007); Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free
Press, 1991). On fourth generation warfare, see T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the
Twenty-First Century (St Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006).
4     Michael L. Gross, Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination and Blackmail in an Age
of Asymmetric Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). For a critique of this narrow
reading of reciprocity, see Mark Osiel, The End of Reciprocity: Terror, Torture and the Law of War
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
5     See, for instance, Charles C. Dunlap, “Lawfare amid Warfare,” The Washington Times, August
3, 2007.
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Francis Lieber on the problem of guerrilla warfare. Halleck, who had a
background in law, was animated by the desire to prevail in the struggle
with Confederate leadership over the legitimacy of the use of irregular
fighters which had developed alongside the actual military confrontation on the battlefields of the American Civil War. On 28 April 1862,
the Confederate Congress adopted the Partisan Ranger Act, which
stipulated the president could authorize bands of partisan rangers to
operate against Union forces behind enemy lines. Halleck was adamant
this was a breach of the customs of war and hoped Lieber would back
him up with an authoritative legal opinion. However, the resulting text
entitled Guerrilla Parties Considered with Reference to the Laws and Usages of
War (1862) must have been a disappointment for Halleck. Lieber produced a remarkably detailed and nuanced legal assessment of irregular
fighters, distinguishing among six different categories: freebooters;
brigands; partisans and free corps; spies, rebels, and conspirators; war
rebels; and the spontaneous rising en masse.6 Of these six categories of
irregulars, only the partisans and free corps and the rising en masse, even
without uniforms, were lawful belligerents in Lieber’s eyes. The guerrilla oscillated between the brigand, the partisan, and the rising en masse,
which, according to Lieber, made it particularly difficult to determine
his or her legal status.7
This was clearly not what Halleck had expected. For Halleck, even
partisans, meaning regular units that operated independently from their
command and, hence, the most regular of all irregular fighters were to
be considered unlawful belligerents and shot, not to mention risings en
masse or guerrillas. Halleck’s disappointment may have been the reason
for his reluctance to support Lieber’s more ambitious project, which
would become known as the Lieber Code.8 Lieber’s treatment of irregular fighters in the Code, written in 1863, is less nuanced. He retained
the distinction between the lawful partisan and other unlawful types
of irregular fighters, thus insisting on this difference of opinion with
Halleck. However, he did not mention the rising en masse, nor did he
discuss the problematic question of the legality of the guerrilla.9
Given Halleck’s opinion on the problem of irregular fighters, it is not
surprising that much of Lieber’s writing on the issue was lost on Union
commanders and troops in the field. However, there was a section in the
Lieber Code that was much more closely followed by Union officers, and
that was the section on “Insurrection—Civil War—Rebellion.” Lieber
has often been credited with trying to codify protections for civilians
in war.10 But that is only partly accurate. In fact, Lieber was rather
ambivalent when it came to protecting civilians from the effects of war.
He did not conceptualize the civilian as a protected group of persons
as such; he used the term “unarmed citizens.” More importantly, the
6     Richard Shelly Hartigan, Lieber’s Code and the Law of War (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1983),
34-39.
7     Ibid., 40
8     When Lieber wrote to Halleck in November 1862, suggesting a more comprehensive set of
rules for the conduct of the war, Halleck replied brusquely, “I have no time at present to consider the
subject.” It was only due to Lieber’s perseverance the code was finally adopted; Mark Grimsley, The
Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy towards Southern Civilians, 1861-1865 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), 149.
9     Hartigan, Lieber’s Code, 60.
10     See, for instance, Theodor Meron,”‘Lieber’s Code and the Principles of Humanity,” Columbia
Journal of Transnational Law 36, no. 22 (1997): 269-81.
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Lieber Code contained two contrasting approaches to the treatment of
what we would call “civilians” today. On one hand, Lieber stated the
“unarmed citizen is to be spared in person, property, and honor as much
as the exigencies of war will admit.”11 On the other, in the section on
“Insurrection—Civil War—Rebellion,” Lieber wrote:
The military commander of the legitimate government, in a war of rebellion, distinguishes between the loyal citizen in the revolted portion of the
country and the disloyal citizen. The disloyal citizen may further be classified
into those citizens known to sympathize with the rebellion without positively aiding it,
and those who, without taking up arms, give positive aid and comfort to the rebellious
enemy without being bodily forced thereto. . . .The commander will throw
the burden of war, as much as lies within his power, on the disloyal citizens, of
the revolted portion or province, subjecting them to a stricter police than
the non-combatant enemies have to suffer in regular war . . . he may expel,
transfer, imprison, or fine the revolted citizens who refuse to pledge themselves
anew as citizens obedient to the law and loyal to the government.12

Lieber’s legal approach to a war of rebellion made protections
for civilians dependent on their behavior and even their political
Weltanschauung. It effectively put all civilians in enemy territory under
general suspicion. Hence, the Lieber Code “erected very few strong barriers against severe treatment” of civilians.13 This approach was closely
followed because Lieber had, in fact, taken his inspiration for this section
from the prevailing practice in the field. The three-tier approach distinguishing between loyal, passively disloyal, and actively disloyal citizens
had been developed in 1862 by local Union commanders in Missouri and
had later been approved by Halleck himself.14 Lieber only mirrored what
was already common practice in the field.
Soon after the end of the American Civil War, the question of how
to deal with irregular fighters became pressing once again, though this
time on the European side of the Atlantic. In 1870, the Prussian army
had defeated the French forces and all but captured Paris when the
French government, now under the leadership of the republican Leon
Gambetta, made a last ditch attempt to stave off defeat. In October
1870, Gambetta called his fellow citizens to resist the German occupation forces as francs-tireurs (literally “free shooters”) and to attack their
lines of communication. The Prussian leadership was enraged. Despite
the French government’s insistence that francs-tireurs were lawful belligerents, the Prussian headquarters issued an order according to which
francs-tireurs were not to be treated as prisoners of war, but to be executed
on capture. This order was later amended and the new decree stipulated
ten years of forced labor rather than immediate executions. However,
German forces treated most francs-tireurs as prisoners of war when
captured. Yet, civilians had to endure harsh treatment by the German
forces, in particular in those areas where francs-tireurs were active. Just as
the Union forces in the American Civil War, the Germans chose a punitive approach based on the assumption that it was ultimately the local
population that was responsible for the francs-tireurs problem.
11     Ibid., 49.
12     Ibid., 71, emphasis added.
13     Grimsley, Hard Hand, 150.
14     For a more detailed account, see Sibylle Scheipers, Unlawful Combatants: A Genealogy of the
Irregular Fighter (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014), chapter 2.
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The defining feature of both the American Civil War and the
Franco-Prussian War was that the opponents had divergent ideas of who
was a lawful belligerent. It was no wonder, then, that contemporaries
felt the need to clarify the laws of war and, in particular, the definition
of irregular fighters. On the American side, the Lieber Code served that
purpose, although Union commanders honored its provisions on irregular fighters more in the breach than in the observance. In Europe, the
Franco-Prussian War sparked efforts to negotiate and codify the laws
of war. Without doubt, it was the experience of the francs-tireurs problem
that provided primary impetus. Negotiations in Europe were heavily
influenced by the Lieber Code, which formed the basis of several draft
proposals debated at the Brussels conference in 1874.
The conference failed to produce anything acceptable to all parties
involved; hence, no law was adopted. The question of the lawfulness of
irregular fighters had become so entangled with issues of military and
political power as well as with ideological differences that no agreement
was possible among the major European powers. However, the attempts
at legal codification opened the definitional battlefield and clarified different positions within it. Political cleavage lines soon became clear:
Germany and Russia, both of which possessed large regular armies,
intended to keep the definition of lawful belligerency highly restrictive,
hence not allowing for a defensive levée en masse or even militia forces. In
contrast, smaller states that relied on militias for their national defense
were opposed to this restrictive proposal. They were supported by
Britain and France. The Brussels conference broke up after one month
of negotiations, and no legal text was adopted. Only a declaration was
issued. However, international lawyers were apparently not discouraged
by this outcome. In 1880, the Oxford Institute of International Law
published its own manual entitled The Laws of War on Land.
The Brussels declaration and the Oxford Manual were similar with
respect to structure and content. Both texts were more inclusive than
the Lieber Code regarding the question of the lawfulness of irregulars.
Articles 9 and 10 of the Brussels declaration stipulated that regular
armies, militia forces, volunteer corps, and a spontaneous rising en masse
against invasion were lawful forms of national defense.15
The fact that neither the Brussels declaration nor the Oxford
Manual garnered widespread acceptance demonstrated that the question
of the definition and treatment of irregular fighters was still undecided.
Consensus on the definition of lawful belligerency was only reached in
the 1907 Hague Convention on the Rules and Customs of War on Land.
The Hague Convention retained the provisions on the lawfulness of the
defensive rising en masse in nonoccupied territory, although it did not
mention other military organizations included in the Oxford Manual,
such as national guards, landsturm, and free corps.16
In sum, the history of the law of armed conflict from Lieber to the
Hague Convention shows, first, that codification efforts were triggered
by the experience of irregular fighting in the American Civil War and the
15     “The Laws of War on Land,” Institute of International Law at Oxford, 9 September 1880, http://
www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/1880a.htm
16     Annex to the Convention “Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land,”
Section I, Chapter I, Art 1-2, in Documents on the Laws of War, ed. Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 73.
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Franco-Prussian War. Second, it demonstrates that the remits of lawful
belligerency were contested between major political actors. Finally, it
shows that, due to this contestation, the legal definition of the irregular
was achieved ex negativo, and there were no provisions on the treatment of
this category of persons. While Lieber had initially started with a detailed
list of defined categories of irregular fighters, the Hague Convention
defines only lawful belligerency. Hence, according to the Hague law,
irregular fighters are all combatants who do not qualify as lawful belligerents and who do not enjoy legal protections such as prisoner of war status.
While much nuance and detail was thus lost from Lieber’s initial
texts on the issue of defining irregular fighters, the tendency to blame
civilians for the activity of irregulars and to make them liable to punitive
measures was carried forward to the early European texts. Both the
Brussels declaration and the Oxford Manual stipulate that occupying
powers can levy fines on the population.17 The Oxford Manual is more
explicit when it comes to the protection of civilians—although it must
be kept in mind that the legal texts at the time still neither used nor
defined this category—and states, “It is forbidden to maltreat inoffensive
populations.”18 At the same time, it makes clear that “The inhabitants of
an occupied territory who do not submit to the orders of the occupant
may be compelled to do so.”19 Hence, the upshot of the early attempts
at codifying the laws of war is that the civilian population only warrants
protection if it fully subjects itself to the occupying forces. This approach
to the laws of war was as much about humanizing war and protecting
local populations against wanton cruelty as it was about disciplining
civilians. Its outlook on civilians was always potentially punitive, and
the reason for this harsh posture was the civilians’ potential links with
irregular fighters: they could aid them or take up arms themselves. So
if the line between the regular and the irregular was unclear at the end
of the nineteenth century, the boundaries between the irregular and the
civilian were even more questionable. This tendency was carried forth
in the Hague laws.20 The atrocities German forces, imbued with a fear
of francs-tireurs that amounted to paranoia, committed in Belgium and
northern France during the first months of World War I, were proof
that the punitive approach had become even more significant in military
operations on the ground. 21
Changes in the law would only come with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which provided more thorough protections for civilians in
occupied territory. This was once again precipitated by a transformation
in the perception of the irregular fighter. The Second World War is mostly
remembered as a classical example of symmetric interstate war, but it had

17     “Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War,” Art
36-48, Brussels, 27 August 1874, http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135; “The Laws of War,” Art
43-60.
18     “The Laws of War,” Art 7.
19     Ibid., Art 48.
20     Karma Nabulsi, “Evolving Conceptions of Civilians and Belligerents: One Hundred Years
after the Hague Peace Conferences,” Civilians in War, ed. Simon Chesterman (Boulder, CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2001), 9-24.
21     John Horne and Alan Kramer, German Atrocities, 1914: A History of Denial (New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press, 2002).
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large irregular aspects.22 While resistance groups fighting against Nazi
occupation in Europe and Japanese occupation in Asia may not have
had a decisive strategic impact, the experience of irregular resistance and
appalling Axis countermeasures left an important legacy for the development of the law of armed conflict after the war. It was difficult to uphold
the image of the irregular fighter as the unlawful rebel given that the war
had vindicated the moral cause of the resistance movements.
The uncomfortable truth was that the potentially punitive approach
towards civilians in occupied territory embodied in the Hague law had
done little to reign in the genocidal excesses of the German occupation
forces on the eastern front and, to a lesser extent, in occupied western
Europe. Of course, the Hague law had neither envisaged nor condoned
the killing of millions of eastern European Jews, but the punitive perspective towards irregular fighters and their alleged civilian supporters
had probably played a certain part in making the actions of the German
occupation forces justifiable in the minds of some German officers
and troops.23 Hence, it was logical to tackle the question of protections
for civilians in occupied territory as one of the most pressing issues in
the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The Fourth Geneva Convention, the
Civilians Convention, accordingly represents the most important legal
innovation achieved in Geneva. It demarcates the civilian as a separate
category of persons entitled to specific protections in war and breaks
with the potentially punitive approach to civilians by prohibiting civilian reprisals, fines, and the taking of hostages.24 It also symbolically
separates the civilian from his or her alleged links with irregular fighters.
At the same time, the Geneva Conventions made little progress with
respect to the definition of and the provisions for irregular fighters. The
articles on lawful belligerency are essentially taken from the Hague rules.
Again, this decision boiled down to political considerations. The French
delegation to the Geneva Conference, which included many former
members of the resistance, had lobbied for the inclusion of provisions
on conditions for lawful acts of resistance against occupying forces, but
the United States and the United Kingdom delegations had no interest.
In the end, France had to realize that it had switched sides: it was no
longer occupied, but part of the Allied occupation forces in Germany.25
However, in one important respect, the Geneva Conventions did
introduce new provisions for irregular fighters: Common Article 3 spells
out minimum protections to apply in armed conflicts “not of an international character.” These include the prohibition of torture and degrading
treatment and the prohibition of executions “without previous judgment
22     Jonathan E. Gumz even makes the case for reconceptualizing the Second World War “as a
series of unbounded insurgencies in that they were not solely confined to professional militaries
alone, but rather involved various ideological and nationalized groups”; “Reframing the Historical
Problematic of Insurgency: How the Professional Military Literature Created a New History and
Missed the Past,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, no. 4 (2009): 553-88.
23     However flimsy their statements in defense of their actions might have been, some officers
at the SS-Einsatzgruppen trial in Nuremberg argued that the executions they carried out had been
lawful, as “those who were killed had been found guilty of partisan warfare and robbery.” Hilary Earl,
The Nuremberg SS-Einsatzgruppen Trial, 1945-1958: Atrocity, Law and History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2009), 144.
24     Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of
August12, 1949, Part I, Art 4, 13, 33 and 43, in Documents, ed. Roberts and Guelff, 302, 306, 312.
25     Karma Nabulsi, Traditions of War: Occupation, Resistance, and the Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), 14; Geoffrey Best, War and Law since 1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 118.

52

Parameters 43(4) Winter 2013-14

pronounced by a regularly constituted court.”26 Not surprisingly, colonial powers, foremost the United Kingdom, were alarmed by the broad
remit of the article. At the time of the Geneva Conference, British
forces were fighting a communist insurgency in Malaya and feared
that Common Article 3 was “possibly restrictive to the operations.”27
Both Britain and France attempted to tackle the problem of possible
restrictions on military operations in the colonies that Common Article
3 entailed by insisting the wars in Kenya and in Algeria, for instance,
were domestic emergencies that did not amount to armed conflicts of a
noninternational character.
Given these strong political interests, it is not surprising legal innovations regarding irregular fighters were developed only after the major
European powers lost their colonies. The rationale for the Additional
Protocols (AP I and II) of 1977 once again arose from historical hindsight:
the wars of decolonization had shown that irregular fighters sometimes
do fight morally defensible wars, albeit with methods that are difficult
to square with the requirements of lawful belligerency as spelled out in
the Hague and Geneva laws. Yet their shortcomings may be excusable
in the light of their situation: due to colonial oppression, many of them
were unable to conform to the requirements for lawful belligerency,
and punishing them would have perpetuated the oppressive regime
they were fighting. The solution was to narrow the conditions for lawful
belligerency by stipulating that lawful combatants are members of any
armed forces, units, or groups commanded by a person responsible to a
party to the armed conflict in question, “even if that Party is represented
by a government or authority not recognized by an adverse Party.”28 As
a procedural requirement, AP I stipulates that combatants have to carry
their arms openly while engaged in an attack or in a military operation
preparatory to an attack.29
In spite of this innovation, the law of armed conflict retained its
negative approach to the problem of irregular fighters. AP I does lower
the requirements for combatant privilege, and hence increases the
variety of persons who qualify for prisoner of war status. At the same
time, it fails to address the question of how to categorize persons who
fail the privileged combatancy test, either because they violate the organizational or procedural requirements set out in Articles 43 and 44, or
because they are civilians who take up arms against occupying forces.
Various legal memos issued by subsequent US administrations, as well
as academic discourse, have used the term “unlawful combatants” as a
label for individuals who are neither privileged combatants nor “peaceful” civilians.30 Others have vehemently argued that the term unlawful
combatants is not a category of the law of armed conflict.31 Even if we
26     Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, Documents, ed. Roberts and Guelff, 198.
27     Army Council Secretariat brief for Secretary of State for War, 1 December 1949, quoted
in Hugh Bennett, Fighting the Mau Mau: The British Army and Counter-Insurgency in the Kenya Emergency
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 68.
28     Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), Section II, Art 43 (1), in
Documents, ed. Roberts and Guelff, 444.
29     Ibid., Section II, Art 44 (3), in Documents, Roberts and Guelff, 444.
30     Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct of Hostilities under the Law of International Armed Conflict
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 30ff.
31     International Committee of the Red Cross, “Report on the Second Expert Meeting on the
Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities,” The Hague, 25-26 October 2004, 17.

Fighting Irregular Fighters

Scheipers

53

leave aside the question of labels, the problem remains that there are very
few legal provisions on the treatment of such persons.32 Moreover, major
international actors such as the US and Israel have not ratified Additional
Protocol I, and are hence only bound by those provisions on irregular
fighters that have become customary international law (Articles 43 and
75 in particular).

Twenty-First Century Conflicts

The history of the codification of the law of armed conflict shows
that it was not exclusively drafted with a view to symmetrical interstate
war. On the contrary, it was the experience of problems posed by irregular fighters which propelled the law step by step from its early stages
to the Additional Protocols of 1977. One important flaw of the law of
armed conflict was corrected along the way: the idea that civilians were
liable for punishment if irregular fighters had operated in their territory.
Another major shortcoming is its negative approach to the definition of
irregular fighters and its lack of provisions for this status, which continued through the different codification stages.
So those scholars and legal practitioners who argue the United
States (and other nations) did not have much to go on in terms of the
law regarding the question of how they should treat al Qaeda suspects
and other irregular fighters in recent operations were not entirely wrong,
though the reason for this was not that the law is outdated.33 Rather, it is
related to the fact that major international actors in successive rounds of
the law's codification had no interest in spelling out a detailed definition
of unlawful belligerency and in stipulating provisions for the treatment
of persons who would fall into this category. The law's exclusionary
approach towards irregular fighters made it all too easy to marginalize
them simply because they were perceived as an anomaly for which the
law did not provide.
This perspective has given the debate on irregular fighters an unfortunate twist in that it has prevented the most relevant question from
being asked: how should the West treat irregular fighters to further its
strategic aims in military operations? Instead, it has led to legal(istic)
extremes. Two extreme positions on a spectrum of different opinions
on the legal treatment of irregular fighters emerged. Both share the view
that the law is outdated, but come to opposite conclusions on the way
forward. At one end of the spectrum are those who aim to create more
explicit rules and add new restrictions; on the other end are those who
argue the law of armed conflict does not apply to irregular fighters and
they are, hence, without any legal rights or protections. Both positions
are fraught with difficulties.
Regarding the first position, it is an oft-repeated observation among
critical international lawyers, commentators, and activists that the
32     Article 45 of the Additional Protocol stipulates that those who are denied prisoner of war
status for failing to meet the requirements of lawful belligerency are entitled to a review of their
status “before a judicial tribunal.” Even if they are not granted prisoner of war status, they must be
treated in accordance with Common Article 3 and Article 75 AP I, which is regarded as customary
international law; all printed in Documents, Roberts and Guelff,446, 198, 463.
33     See, for instance, Benjamin Wittes, Law and the Long War: The Future of Justice in the Age of
Terror (New York: Penguin, 2008); John B. Bellinger III, “Legal Issues Related to Armed Conflict
with Non-state Groups,” in Prisoners in War, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2010), 251-62.
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West’s approach to irregular fighters in the War on Terror, and in particular to their detention and interrogation, has been characterized by
the creation of legal “black holes, vacuums” and the exploitation of legal
“loopholes.”34 The call for more law seemed to be a logical conclusion.
However, it is not entirely correct that the most disastrous aspects of
the treatment of irregular fighters in recent conflicts stemmed from the
absence of law or legal reasoning. On the contrary, the numerous legal
memos on irregular fighters issued since 2001 were written by lawyers
and used legal arguments and concepts.35 Against this background, it
is hard to see how the default option of more law should have provided viable safeguards and solutions. Moreover, the fact that there is
a range of concepts and ideas on how the law of armed conflict should
be updated to regulate the treatment of irregular fighters suggests that
arriving at a new internationally binding consensus would be difficult
and time-consuming. Limited attempts at formulating preliminary rules
such as the Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees, in which the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member states,
the United Nations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) are involved, are under way.36 While these preliminary debates
are laudable and useful, even such limited attempts will take time to
produce results that could be taken as firm guidance in operations on
the ground.
On the other end of the spectrum are those who assume that the law
of armed conflict does not apply. However, as discussed above, Common
Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 AP I, offer minimum
protections for all categories of persons in armed conflict, hence also for
irregular fighters. These sources comprise prohibitions against murder,
torture, and inhumane and degrading treatment; of enforced prostitution; of the taking of hostages; of collective punishments; and of threats
of any of those acts. Furthermore, they spell out some basic procedural
rules for prosecuting individuals for penal offences.37 They do allow
for the detention or internment of individuals who may pose a threat
to the security of states involved in an armed conflict. What they do
not clarify is first, what kind of evidence such detention has to be based
and, second, what the criteria and procedures for continued detention
or, alternatively, release are.38
34     To a certain extent, this charge is also leveled against the practice of targeted killing. Although
the legal discourse on targeted killing is related to the issues discussed here, I cannot cover it in this
context for reasons of space limitations. For a useful legal starting point, see Nils Melzer, Targeted
Killing in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
35     Most of the memos issued by the Bush administration in the years 2002-04 were collected
and published in Karen J. Greenberg, Joshua L. Dratel, and Anthony Lewis, eds., The Torture Papers:
The Road to Abu Ghraib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Later memos by US
administrations as well as legal memos by other NATO states that are relevant for the treatment of
irregular fighters remain classified.
36     “Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International Military Operations,”
Udenrigsministeriet Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, http://um.dk/en/politics-and-diplomacy/
copenhagen-process-on-the-handling-of-detainees-in-international-military-operations/; on the debate on new legal rules on detention, see also Adam Roberts, “Detainees: Misfits in Peace and War,”
in Prisoners in War, ed. Sibylle Scheipers (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 276f.
37     In addition, some parts of international human rights law may apply as well in specific
situations. However, human rights protections would probably not go substantially beyond the
principles spelled out in article 75 AP I, although specific principles such as the non-refoulement
rule (covering the prohibition of transferring detainees to a state that may torture them) would have
an effect on operations.
38     Roberts, “Detainees,” 270.
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In the absence of new legal rules, political and strategic solutions to
these issues need to be found. The basic challenge is to gear the treatment of
irregular fighters in theaters comparable to Afghanistan and Iraq towards
the aim of political stabilization and societal reconciliation. Asymmetric
conflicts and the dilemmas related to the treatment of irregular fighters are not new. What is new, however, is the emphasis on sustainable
pacification—stabilization is the current buzzword—as the ultimate
goal in these wars. Against this background, it is questionable whether
a purely exclusionary approach is the way forward. Political stabilization
requires societal reconciliation and the reintegration of irregular fighters
into the social and political system of the target state in question. The
negotiations with Taliban leaders, which started in June 2013 in Qatar,
bear witness to the West’s (belated) acknowledgment of reconciliation
and reintegration as a vital component of long-term stabilization.
This perspective applies in particular to those individuals whose
allegiance is first to the local insurgency, that is, fighters who are not
involved in global terrorist operations. The question of their treatment
is most usefully discussed from the perspective of war’s end: how ought
fighters be treated to enable their successful reintegration into society at
the end of the war? How will their treatment during the conflict impact
on the chances of post-conflict reconciliation and hence the achievement of a lasting peace?39 Supposedly more enlightened commentators,
in particular on the European side of the Atlantic, often suggest that
treating them as criminals rather than gratifying them with combatant
status is the way forward when it comes to treatment of irregular fighters. However, there are indications from historical cases, in particular
the United Kingdom’s experience with the Irish Republican Army in
the 1970s and 1980s, that acknowledging some kind of combatant status
of detained irregular fighters and local terrorists can open the road to
long-term political solutions.40 On the other hand, criminal prosecutions
would be the preferable solution for those who have been suspected of
involvement in the planning or implementation of terrorist attacks of a
global nature. The fact these prosecutions have failed seems to have little
to do with principle obstacles. Rather, the two greatest inhibiting factors
were, first, that the military commissions initially charged with putting
this group of individuals on trial were based on rules and procedures
that were so flawed they proved almost impossible to correct. Secondly,
parts of the evidence to be used against these suspects was based on
torture and hence inadmissible in any lawful trial.41 These complications
could have been avoided had the minimum protections stipulated in
Article 75 AP I been implemented.

39     For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Sibylle Scheipers, “Conclusion: Prisoners and
Detainees in Current and Future Military Operations,” in Prisoners in War, 313-20.
40     While the Thatcher government never officially accepted the IRA’s claim that imprisoned
IRA fighters were POWs, it did tacitly concede to most of the IRA hunger strikers’ demands, which
principally aimed at removing the stigma of criminalization from IRA prisoners. These concessions
occurred at a time when the IRA’s engagement with the political system increased. The treatment of
IRA prisoners had at the very least a stabilizing effect on the IRA’s nonviolent political engagement.
See also Richard English, Armed Struggle: The History of the IRA (London: Macmillan, 2003), chapters
5 and 6.
41     Roberts, “Detainees,” 272.
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Conclusion

The law of armed conflict is a peculiar field of law as it refuses
to regulate a phenomenon that repeatedly provided the main impetus
for its progressive codification: irregular fighters. Rather than providing
definitions and rules on the treatment of irregular fighters, successive
generations of lawmakers chose a negative approach to the phenomenon: the irregular is he (or she) who does not qualify for privileged
combatancy and the attendant privileges and protections. This peculiarity of the law gave rise to claims that the established legal rules as
laid down in the Hague and the Geneva conventions are outdated and
inapplicable to wars in twenty-first century.
However, what these claims overlook is that the law was influenced
by considerations of political power and military expediency at all stages
of its codification. Halleck rejected Lieber’s ideas on the treatment of
irregular fighters, as he found them too lenient and feared their implementation might endanger Union victory in the American Civil War. Neither
Germany nor Russia had an interest in considering small state militias as
lawful belligerents. And while the Allies after World War II perceived
it as both ethical and useful to enhance protections for civilians in war,
France and Britain, in particular, were wary of codifying the law in such a
way that it might endanger their colonial authority. In all these instances,
powerful states had a strong interest in excluding irregular fighters from
the remits of the law of armed conflict.
International law, including the law of armed conflict, is mainly
made by states, and it is neither surprising nor entirely reprehensible that
it bears the mark of state interest. What is important, however, is to be
aware of the fact that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the
outright exclusion of irregular fighters may not be in the West’s strategic
interest. As we have seen, asymmetric conflicts are not new. Irregular
fighters have existed at all times in the history of war. What is new,
however, are the West’s strategic and political aims of stabilization in
conflicts against irregular fighters. In the twenty-first century, western
states are facing the challenge of bringing the law of armed conflict in
line with the strategic aim of stabilization or, rather, to apply it in a way
that does not undermine this aim.

